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Abstract
The present paper investigates the eﬀectiveness of public subsidies to busi-
ness enterprise research in a panel of OECD countries. We contribute to the
literature by explicitly distinguishing between eﬀects of a subsidy on R&D
employment and expenditure, thereby accounting for a potential increase in
scientists’ wages. The results indicate that subsidies are eﬀective in generat-
ing additional research. We ﬁnd that an increase in the direct subsidy rate of
one percentage point leads to at least 1% more business R&D employment in
the long run. Expenditure for business research increases by roughly 20-30%
more than employment. We take this as evidence that subsidies also raise
scientists’ wages. In addition, we ﬁnd that there exists signiﬁcant crowding
out of private research through university research. Research performed in
public non-university institutions seems to have no eﬀect on private research.
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11 Introduction
Research and development has been identied as one of the principal sources of
economic progress.1 It leads to the discovery of ideas and innovations, which in
turn enhance productivity and generate growth. Empirical studies by, for example,
Griliches (1992) and Caballero and Jae (1993) indicate that there is too little
private R&D because of market failure. These market failure arguments are probably
the main reason why all OECD countries take public measures to increase research.
In Europe, heads of governments agreed in late 2002 at the Barcelona summit upon
an initiative called "More Research for Europe". They want to see Europe's R&D
investment rise from its current 1.9% of GDP to 3% by 2010, hence by about 50%.
This would close the current gap to the US, where R&D expenditure amounts to
2.8% of GDP and Japan (2.98%). The dierence between Europe and the US and
Japan is due to low R&D expenditure in rms in Europe. One way to increase R&D
in rms is to subsidize private R&D investments. However, it is unclear to what
extent subsidies actually increase business research activity. Even if R&D subsidies
result in an increase of R&D spending of 50%, does this mean that R&D employment
increases by 50% as well? Or does a signicant fraction of the increased spending
go into higher wages?
This paper addresses these issues and investigates the eectiveness of subsidies
to private business research on a macroeconomic level using a panel data set of 15
OECD countries from 1981 to 2002. We disentangle the eects of direct subsidies to
R&D on aggregate R&D employment and expenditure. We nd that a 1 percentage
point increase in the direct subsidy rate leads to at least 1% more business R&D
employment in the long run. Expenditure for business research increases more than
employment by roughly 20-30%. We take this as evidence that subsidies also raise
scientists' wages. The eect is even stronger in the short run, when the increase in
expenditure is 60% higher than the increase in employment. In addition, we nd
1See, e.g., Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) for theoretical and Griliches (1994) for
empirical work.
2that private research is signicantly crowded out by university research. Research
performed in public non-university institutions seems to have no eect on private
research.
The eectiveness of subsidies to business R&D has been investigated extensively
in the literature. David, Hall, and Toole (2000) and Klette, Moen, and Griliches
(2000) provide surveys. Most studies analyze the eectiveness of specic programs
at the rm level. However, in order to evaluate broad, economy-wide policy mea-
sures (for example the initiative "More Research for Europe") the micro-econometric
evaluation studies should be complemented by macro-econometric work for two rea-
sons. First, there might be "migration" of scientists from a non-supported to a
supported rm. This shows up as a positive eect of public support in rm level
studies, especially if the non-supported rm is in the control group. Indeed, Berger
(1993) shows that R&D spending among rms that cannot use R&D tax subsidies
falls when subsidies rise. Second, an increase in the demand for R&D inputs due
to large-scale subsidy programs can lead to a signicant increase in the wages of
scientists. Goolsbee (1998) provides empirical evidence of such an eect. He uses
household survey data to show that the income of scientists and engineers in the
U.S. increased substantially with aggregate subsidies to R&D in the entire economy,
whereas the number of hours worked by each scientists remained almost constant.
He concludes that simple evaluation studies might overstate the eects of govern-
ment R&D spending on private R&D employment by as much as 30-50%.
There are only a few studies investigating the eectiveness of subsidies to business
R&D at the macroeconomic level. Levy and Terleckyj (1983) nd that there exists
a positive impact of government contract R&D on private R&D investment in U.S.
time series data. Guellec and Pottelsberghe (2003) conrm this result with panel
data. They estimate that one dollar given to rms results in 1.7 dollars of research.
Levy (1990) nds a positive impact only in a some countries of his panel, while in
other countries no eect is found. All these studies have in common that they regress
national private R&D expenditure on aggregate subsidy payments and a number of
control variables.
3We depart from this approach in two ways. First, in order to account for the
potential increase in scientists' wages we run two separate regressions: one with
R&D-employment and the other with total expenditure (i.e., private expenditure
plus aggregate subsidy payments) as the dependent variable. Comparing the coe-
cients of the regressions allows us to assess whether the subsidy has a greater impact
on expenditure than on employment. We interpret our nding that expenditure re-
acts more strongly than employment to subsidies as evidence that subsidies increase
scientists' wages.
Our second departure from previous macroeconomic studies is to use the subsidy
rate instead of aggregate subsidy payments as an explanatory variable. Governments
can inuence the decisions of private agents by changing relative prices through taxes
and subsidies. Public subsidies for business R&D should therefore have an eect on
private R&D investment only if they inuence the cost of doing research at the mar-
gin. The reduction in marginal cost implied by subsidies is better captured by the
subsidy rate than by aggregate subsidy payments. A convenient byproduct of using
the subsidy rate as the explanatory policy variable is that the omitted variable bias
discussed by David, Hall, and Toole (2000) is mitigated. They argue that the vari-
ation in private spending for R&D and in aggregate subsidy payments might both
be driven by variation in the "technological opportunity set". Since technological
opportunities for commercially attractive innovations are hard to control for, re-
gressions of private on public R&D expenditure will tend to overstate the impact of
subsidization. Using the subsidy rate, i.e., the ratio of public over private spending
on R&D, as the explanatory variable has the advantage that it remains unaected
by the technological opportunity set. We thus estimate the impact of a change in
the subsidization rate on research employment and total expenditure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
our theoretical framework. In section 3, we present the data. Section 4 gives the
estimation results and further examines the eect of additional policy variables. The
last section concludes.
42 Direct subsidies - a structural framework
David and Hall (2000) have argued that structural modelling of the "R&D black
box" is necessary to better interpret the empirical estimates of subsidy eectiveness.
In order to disentangle the eects on prices and quantities, we employ a model with
labor as the only input in R&D.2 The market for researchers can be diagrammed
using demand and supply curves as presented in Figure 1. As wages increase, more
scientists and engineers will decide to work as researchers in rms. The government's
intention is to increase the number of researchers. A subsidy of β dollars for each
dollar spent by private rms is paid. An increase in the subsidies will shift the
demand curve for researchers outward from D to Dβ as more research projects are
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Figure 1: Wage eect of R&D-subsidy
2.1 Wage and employment eects
As can be seen in Figure 1, an increase in the subsidy rate β leads to an increase
in employment L and total expenditure Etotal = wsL (which corresponds to the
area OLBws). The extent to which R&D subsidies lead to an increase in wages
depends crucially on the wage elasticity of the supply of researchers. An increase
2In section 4.3 we discuss the role of capital in research. Note that most of the research
expenditure is labor cost (see Goolsbee (1998) or The National Science Foundation (1995)).
5in expenditure will be more pronounced relative to an increase in employment the
lower the elasticity of supply of R&D-labor. Consider the extreme case of a totally
inelastic supply of R&D labor. In such a case, R&D employment does not depend on
the subsidization rate; total expenditure increases and private expenditure remains
unchanged. In contrast, if the labor supply is totally elastic, total expenditure
increases proportional to labor.
Interestingly, the eect of an increase of the subsidy rate β on private expenditure
is ambiguous and depends on the slope of the demand curve (i.e., the shaded area
in Figure 1 might be larger or smaller than the area OLCwd). An insignicant co-
ecient in an empirical study that regresses private expenditure on public subsidies
is therefore consistent with a positive eect of subsides on R&D employment.
A priori, it is not clear whether one should expect research-labor to be elastic or
inelastic in supply. Firms face a large pool of university graduates and should be able
to nd additional researchers with relative ease. Moreover, the fraction of qualied
labor - e.g., employees with university degrees - employed in research departments
is rather small. In the most developed countries, e.g., the US, Japan, Germany, and
Great Britain, it is about 3%, in most of the other sample countries, it is less than
1%. This would tend to support the idea of relatively elastic supply curves. However,
Goolsbee (1998) nds for the U.S. that an increase of government subsidy payments
leads to a considerable increase in the income of scientists, whereas the numbers of
hours worked increased much less. His estimate for the supply elasticity of research-
labor of about 0.1-0.2 corresponds to a very inelastic, steep labor supply curve.
This implies that R&D is likely to be done by experienced and highly specialized
scientists, who are not easy to nd.
2.2 Short and long run eects
Subsidies can have very dierent eects in the short and long run. Beside the di-
rect eect as discussed above, public aid to business R&D is likely to have further
dynamic eects. David and Hall (2000, pp 1171) discuss the dynamic eects exten-
6sively. Our discussion focuses on the implications that we consider to be of special
relevance at the macro level: the scientist training eect and the technology spillover
eect.
The rst dynamic eect stems from the training of new scientists and engineers.
Labor supply will be more elastic in the long run than in the short run. In the
short run, the number of qualied employees is xed, since it takes some time for
young people to get educated (and experienced) in those elds where new research
opportunities arise. However, when young people decide on their eld of study, they
take into account expectations on future employment probabilities and salaries. As
discussed above, the wage rate of scientists ws increases in the subsidy rate. In
the absence of knowledge spillover eects, the large long run elasticity of the labor
supply will moderate the impact of the subsidy on the wage rate.
With respect to the demand for researchers, the main eect that is put forward
by David, Hall, and Toole (2000) as well as by the whole R&D based growth litera-
ture (e.g., Barrio-Castro, Lopez-Bazo, and Serrano-Domingo (2002)) is the technol-
ogy spillover eect. By developing a new technology, a rm heavily draws on the
knowledge incorporated in existing technologies. Hence it could be that subsidized
research helps to foster a new technology which in turn induces other rms to build
on that technology. An often cited example is innovation in information technology,
which was subsidized signicantly in its early stages of development.
The scientist training and the technology spillover eect predict that the impact
of public subsidies on R&D employment is larger in the long run than in the short
run. In contrast, the impact of subsidies on wages might be bigger or smaller in the
long run than in the short run. Increased demand through long run spillover eects
reinforces the upward pressure on wages while an increase in the long run supply
of scientists through training works in the opposite direction. Before turning to the
empirical investigation of this question, we briey formalize the outlined model.
72.3 Underlying Model
Let ϕ(Lt,Xd
t ) be the number of R&D projects that can be undertaken in the econ-
omy given that Lt scientists do research. Xd is a vector of variables representing
technological opportunities or other variables that inuence the productivity of re-
searchers. Denote t() the value of every innovation. It captures the state of
demand for innovative goods and institutional conditions aecting the feasibility of
appropriating innovation benets.
The demand for research labor is determined by a free-entry or zero-prot con-
dition that equalizes cost and returns to R&D:
ϕ(Lt,X
d




t is the wage rate faced by private rms. Suppose that the supply of R&D






where Xs are shift variables and ws
t is the wage rate received by researchers. Given
that governments subsidize R&D labor at a rate β, the equilibrium is determined
by the amount of research for which ws = (1 + β)wd. Solving the model for Lt and
log-linearizing yields Equation 3.
In order to disentangle the eects on prices and quantities we use the available
information on R&D labor as well as on R&D expenditure. If we continue to assume
that salaries are the only cost of research, total expenditure, i.e., that nanced by
public or private agencies, of R&D is Etotal
t = (1 + β)wtLt.
lnLt = c1 ln(1 + β) + c2 lnXt + c3 lnπt (3)
lnE
total
t = a1 ln(1 + β) + a2 lnXt + a3 lnπt (4)
The elasticities of R&D-employment, pre- and post-subsidy wages with respect to
the average subsidization rate are therefore straightforward to calculate. They are
8given by:
ε(Lt,1 + β) = c1
ε(w
s
t,1 + β) = a1   c1
ε(w
d
t,1 + β) = a1   c1   1
In addition, estimates of the wage elasticity of the supply of researchers can be











In order to allow for dynamic eects in our structural framework, we introduce
the stock of knowledge as an additional variable in our model. Following the en-
dogenous growth literature, e.g., Romer (1990) or Jones and Williams (2000), we
assume that the number of R&D projects that can be successfully undertaken in the




where ϕ is either increasing (most likely) or decreasing but convex in At. The
evolution of the stock of knowledge over time depends on the existing stock of
knowledge and on the newly created technologies, such that:
_ At = ϕ()   δAt (6)
where δ is the depreciation rate. Log-linearizing the model around the steady state
( _ A = 0) results in:
lnAt = γ lnAt−1 + (1   γ)lnA
∗(βt,Xt,πt) (7)
where lnγ corresponds to the speed of convergence to the steady state as implied
by the model parameters. A∗(βt,Xt,πt) is the steady state value of technology and
is determined by the exogenous model parameters (βt,Xt,πt). If the latter stayed
constant over time, A∗ would be realized in the limit.
9Since At is not observable, we can solve the linearized zero prot condition for
lnAt,lnAt−1, and lnA∗ and substitute in the last Equation 7 to get:
lnLt = γ lnLt−1 + (1   γ)lnL
∗(βt,Xt,πt) (8)
where lnL∗(βt,Xt,πt) is determined as in the static model, Equation 3. The dynamic
model is thus straightforward to estimate through inclusion of the lagged dependent
variable.
3 Data
We investigate the business enterprise sector, which is one of the four sectors of
R&D performance.3 The other three sectors are higher education, government, pri-
vate non prot (PNP). The data on research employment in the business enterprise
sector, subsidies to the business sector, research expenditure of the private sector
nanced by itself, higher education expenditure on R&D and government intramu-
ral expenditure on R&D are taken from OECD (2003b). The investigated number
of OECD countries in the period 1981-2002 had to be somewhat reduced because
of missing observations which made estimation impossible.4 The included countries
are shown in Table 1.
Research employment data covers all researchers in the business sector and all
those providing direct services to the researchers (e.g., secretaries, clerical sta).5
3The business enterprise sector includes all rms, organizations and institutions whose primary
activity is the market production of goods and services (other than higher education) for sale to
the general public at an economically signicant price, and the public enterprises and private non
prot institutes mainly serving them. For a description of the other three sectors see Summary of
Frascati Manual, (OECD 1994, pp 16-17).
4The Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator requires taking rst dierences.
5Data are expressed in full-time equivalents (FTE). One FTE may be thought of as one person-
year. For the USA, only data on researchers without the supporting sta were available. However
the correlation between researchers and (researchers + sta) is above 0.9 in countries where both
indicators are available. About half of research employment consists of researchers. For the USA,
10Expenditure on R&D in the business enterprise sector (BERD) is nanced through
two main sources: Own nances (BERDb) and government subsidies (BERDg). The
ratio of the two, β =
BERDg
BERDb, is a measure of average subsidization of the business
enterprise sector by the government. Each private dollar of research expenditure
is subsidized by β dollars from the government. Furthermore data on expenditure
on R&D in the higher education sector (HERD) are available.6 Government intra-
mural expenditure on R&D (GOVERD)7 and higher education expenditure were
normalized by GDP, which is also taken from the OECD (2003b).8
The cross country variation of the average subsidization rate β is substantial. It
ranges between less than 2 percent in Japan to more than 30 percent in the U.S.A.
with an unweighed average of 13.8 percent. The high values for the US are also
stressed by Goolsbee (1998) who emphasizes the role of the government sector in
national R&D, where most of the public money is going to the defence sector. Less
than one percent of the population work as researchers in the private sector in all
considered countries. However these gures are quite heterogenous across countries
ranging from 0.07 percent in Spain to 0.42 percent in Japan. Expenditure on R&D
in the university sector and in the government sector represents less than 1 percent
of GDP respectively in all investigated countries. The cross country variation is
we took the number of researchers only, which should not be problematic because of xed eects.
Overall data for total employment were more readily available, and we thus chose total research
employment.
6HERD is composed of all universities, colleges of technology, and other institutes of post-
secondary education, whatever their source of nance or legal status. It also includes all research
institutes, experimental stations, and clinics operating under the direct control of, or administered
by, associated with higher education establishments.
7The government sector is composed of all departments, oces, and other bodies which furnish
but normally do not sell to the community those common services, other than higher education,
which cannot otherwise be conveniently and economically provided and administered by the state
and the economic and social policy of the community.
8Data on β, HERD, and GOVERD had many missing observations. We therefore linearly
interpolated right hand variables in the case of only one missing year. With two or more missing







Australia 4.45 0.12 0.36 0.41
Belgium 7.57 0.23 0.38 0.08
Canada 12.35 0.21 0.38 0.28
Germany 12.16 0.39 0.42 0.36
Denmark 10.37 0.28 0.36 0.28
Spain 10.96 0.07 0.20 0.16
Finland 4.58 0.35 0.46 0.37
France 24.74 0.27 0.36 0.51
UK 23.72 0.28 0.35 0.30
Italy 19.53 0.10 0.25 0.24
Japan 1.54 0.42 0.52 0.26
Netherlands 10.76 0.23 0.53 0.36
Norway 24.80 0.22 0.38 0.26
New Zealand 7.80 0.08 0.27 0.43
USA 32.52 0.30 0.37 0.26
Table 1: Sample means in percent. β is the the subsidization rate, HERD is
expenditure on R&D in universities, and GOV ERD is expenditure on R&D in the
government sector.
between 0.2 for Spain and 0.52 for Japan in the case of university research. In the
case of the government sector research, the range is between 0.08 percent in Belgium
and 0.51 percent in France.
However the measures of R&D are not stable over time. In fact, the subsidization
rates were quite disparate in the 1980s, converging to similar subsidization rates in
the late 1990s (see Figure 2). The percentage of researchers in the population
increased in almost all countries in the investigated period (Figure 3), while funding
for government research institutes declined. Expenditure for university research, in
contrast, increased in most countries with Sweden having the highest initial value
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Figure 3: Researchers in the business enterprise sector as a percentage of the pop-
ulation. Data for the USA∗ are researchers without supporting sta, and support
sta and researchers otherwise.
13For the regression analysis, we further include control variables. Real GDP,
measured in purchasing power parities presented by the OECD (2003b), is a broad
measure of general economic activity. Higher GDP will lead to more research activity
since the prot opportunity set increases. Conversely, higher research activity will
positively aect GDP growth. The openness of the economy is computed as the
ratio of exports plus imports over GDP. The export and import data were taken
from the OECD (2003a). The openness of the economy is a measure for potential
spillovers from one economy to the next and furthermore, accounts for additional
prot opportunities abroad.
4 Determinants of R&D: Empirical evidence
We estimate the model presented in Section 2, or more precisely estimate equations 9
and 10. Besides the lagged dependent variable and the subsidization rate, we include
GDP as a broad measure to capture economic activity and prot opportunities.
The openness of the economy captures further prot opportunities abroad and also
technology spillover eects. The separate estimation of the two equations allows us
to disentangle the eect of changing subsidization rates on employment and total
expenditure.
lnLit = γl lnLi,t−1 + c1 ln(1 + β)it + c2 lnGDPit + c3 lnopennessit + it (9)
lnE
total
it = γe lnE
total
i,t−1 + a1 ln(1 + β)it + a2 lnGDPit + a3 lnopennessit + νit (10)
4.1 Methodology
We use three dierent estimators for the regressions. As a rst benchmark we esti-
mate standard, non-dynamic xed eect panel regressions;9 the results are presented
in the rst two columns of Table 2.
9We estimated xed eect, not random eect regressions as the Hausman specication test
(Greene 2000, p.576) results indicated.
14We next estimate the dynamic model as presented in Section 2. If innovations
depend on the existing stock of research, then last year's innovations inuence those
today. Research projects often extend over a period of several years. A high autocor-
relation in the processes of research employment and expenditure can be expected.
The estimation of a dynamic model is therefore appropriate.
In a panel with xed eects, a lagged dependent variable violates the strict
exogeneity assumption. Baltagi (2001) points out that the basic problem of including
the lagged dependent variable is that it is, like the dependent variable, a function
of the xed eect. This renders the OLS estimator biased and inconsistent. The
xed eect (within) estimator will also be biased (Nickell 1981). Therefore Arellano
and Bond (1991) proposed a General Method of Moment (GMM) estimator which
overcomes these problems. It is now the standard method to estimate dynamic
panels, for further details refer to Baltagi (2001, p. 131). The Arellano-Bond GMM
procedure involves rst dierencing the model in order to remove xed eects. The
dierenced equation is estimated, the lagged dependent variable is instrumented
using all available lags of the variable in levels. The results of the Arellano-Bond
estimation of the dynamic panel are presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2. The
Arellano-Bond test that the average autocovariance in the residuals of order 2 is
0 could not be rejected at any conventional signicance level. The Sargan test
also conrms that the instruments are valid. Therefore the regressions pass two
important specication criteria and the results can be readily interpreted.
In the last set of regressions, we account for the fact that GDP might not be an
exogenous variable to R&D. Aghion and Howitt (1998) and Romer (1990) among
others argue that technological progress constitutes one of the principal components
of economic growth, thereby rendering GDP endogenous. We therefore instrument
GDP with its own lags.
15Panel Arellano Bond Arellano Bond
Fixed Eects GDP endogenous
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(L) ln(Etotal) ln(L) ln(Etotal) ln(L) ln(Etotal)
LDV 0.85 0.77 0.86 0.82
(33.86) (26.23) (37.67) (31.92)
ln(1 + β) 1.41 1.72 0.21 0.37 0.15 0.24
(7.36) (7.26) (2.32) (3.01) (2.08) (2.41)
ln(openness) 0.37 0.21 0.09 0.15 0.09 0.15
(5.38) (2.44) (3.58) (4.23) (3.93) (4.66)
ln(GDP) 1.44 2.03 0.22 0.43 0.18 0.27
(22.17) (25.27) (2.22) (3.08) (2.15) (2.29)
constant -7.57 -18.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-8.61) (-16.63) (-0.85) (-1.39) (-0.93) (-1.20)
ln(1 + β)long 1.40 1.65 1.06 1.36
(p-value) (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01)
R2 (within) 0.73 0.76
AR1 errors, Pr > z 0.38 0.08 0.59 0.18
AR2 errors, Pr > z 0.34 0.79 0.28 0.95
Sargan, Pr > X2 1 1 1 1
Observations 258 258 198 198 198 198
Table 2: Estimation period is 1981-2001 in an unbalanced sample. z-statistics (t-
statistics) are in italics. L is the number of researchers, Etotal are total expenditure
on R&D. The long run elasticity is the coecient of ln(1 + β) divided by 1 minus the
coecient of the lagged dependent variable (LDV). The p-value of the Wald test on
signicance of long run elasticity refers to H0: the long-run eect is zero. Arellano-
Bond test on average order 1 autocovariance in residuals (AR1 errors) with H0 :The
residuals are not autocorrelated. Arellano-Bond test on average order 2 autoco-
variance in residuals (AR2 errors) with H0: The residuals are not autocorrelated.
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions (results from 2-step GMM with standard
errors not corrected for heteroscedasticity), H0: The over-identifying restrictions are
valid.
164.2 Estimation Results
Table 2 presents the estimation results. The subsidy rate has a positive and signif-
icant eect on research employment in all specications. An increase in the subsi-
dization of one percentage point (since ln(1 + β)  β) leads to an increase of R&D
employment of at least one percent in the long run.10 A long run coecient close to
unity is obtained in the Arellano-Bond estimator with endogenous GDP (column 5).
If GDP is not instrumented (column 3), the coecient is 1.4. The estimates of the
static xed eects panel regression are very close to the long-run results of the Arel-
lano Bond estimators. In the short run, the eect is much smaller. An increase in
the subsidy rate of one percentage point leads to 0.21 % more research employment
(0.15% if GDP is endogenous). Hence, our results support the view that dynamic
eects are very important; roughly seven times larger than the immediate impact.
The eect on total expenditure for business R&D is stronger. In the Arellano-
Bond regression with endogenous GDP, the short run coecient of β is 60% higher
than the corresponding one of the employment regression (0.24 compared to 0.15).
In the long run, the coecient of β is 1.36. This implies that research expenditure in
the long run increases by 28% more than research employment. The huge increase
in wages in the short run compared to the reaction of employment is thus mitigated
but still substantial in the long run. The dierence between short and long run is
even more pronounced in the estimation with endogenous GDP (columns 5 and 6).
Our estimates can be used to compute wage-elasticities of labor supply in the
research sector. According to Equation 5, it is 1.6 in the short and roughly 3.5 in
the long run. The magnitudes are are much larger than that estimated by Goolsbee
(1998). He nds a supply elasticity of 0.1 to 0.2. However his estimations were
done using data for the US 1968-94 and inclusive of the ratio of all federal R&D
10Another way of interpreting the results is the following: Increasing the household wage relative
to rm cost by one percent leads to a long-run increase in research employment of one percent.
Evaluated at the sample mean, an increase in ln(1 + β) of one percent corresponds to an increase
of β of 0.995 percentage points. The average subsidization rate in our sample is β = 13%.
17to GDP. As we have seen in the last section, subsidization rates were very high
in the US, especially in the early times of the sample. Goolsbee's investigated
period covers a time of high military budgets, thus subsidies, due to the cold war,
and therefore it is possible that the measured supply elasticities of researchers are
lower. In addition, Goolsbee shows that the eect on wages is much higher in
the aeronautical, mechanical, metallurgical, and electrical sectors, all recipients of
high shares of defence spending. Most important, however, the supply elasticity
calculated by Goolsbee measures the increase in an average scientist's working time
due to higher wages. Our estimate, in contrast, takes into account the hiring of new
scientists.
The control variables have the expected sign and coecient magnitudes in all
specications. Openness and GDP have a a signicant positive inuence both on
research employment and expenditure in the business enterprise sector. The coe-
cient on GDP is larger for total expenditure indicating that increases in GDP lead
to higher wages for researchers.
4.3 The importance of capital in R&D
So far we have attributed dierences in the reaction of expenditure and employment
to changes in the wage rate. Since even in the long run, R&D expenditures increase
by 20 to 30% more than employment, we interpret our ndings as evidence that
subsidies increase scientists' wages substantially. This interpretation is in line with
the ndings of Goolsbee (1998), who provides evidence for an increase in wages of
roughly the same magnitude (even slightly higher) in a panel of household survey
data.
Still, there is a dierent potential explanation for this nding, namely substitu-
tion towards capital. If labor and capital are substitutes in the process of R&D,
and capital is supplied more elastically than labor, subsidization of R&D will lead
to an increase in capital intensity that could explain the stronger response of R&D
expenditure in our regressions. However, if capital and labor are gross complements
18as inputs to research, our estimate of the increase in wages, a1   c1, even underes-
timates the true impact of subsidies on labor cost.11 The intuition for this result is
that the increase in expenditure (as measured by a1) is a weighted average of the
increase of labor and of capital cost. If capital is supplied elastically, capital cost
does not increase at all, and labor cost must have increased by more than average
cost. Hence, the observed increase in expenditure is a combination of a very strong
increase in labor cost and no increase in capital cost. We explore this idea in more
detail in appendix A.
We are not aware of any evidence on whether capital and labor are substitutes
or complements in the production process of innovation. Estimating the elasticity of
substitution is dicult because one requires data on the capital intensity of research.
Such data is currently not available. Still, intuitively capital and labor are more
likely to be complements in research. We therefore believe it safe to interpret our
results as evidence for a substantial eect of subsidies on scientists' wages, thus
conrming the ndings of Goolsbee (1998).
4.4 Other policy variables
Instead of paying subsidies to business R&D, governments can use other policy
instruments to foster research. A very direct way of increasing R&D is to fund
research in the higher education sector (universities) or other public research centers.
However, it is likely that research in these institutions also aects business R&D. On
the one hand, research done in universities might increase the protability of business
research through positive spillover eects. It could also increase the education and
therefore the supply of young researchers. On the other hand, universities and
private research departments both employ educated scientist. Increased funding for
universities might therefore induce upward pressure on scientists' wages, thereby
11Capital and labor are gross complements if the elasticity of substitution is smaller than one.
Substitution towards one factor due to changes in the relative factor prices is overcompensated by
an income eect.
19leading to a crowding out of private research.
Table 3 looks at two further policy variables and estimates the eect of these
variables on private research activity. First, we include expenditure on R&D in pub-
lic research institutions (GOVERD) as a share of GDP. We nd that GOVERD has
no inuence on private research. In regressions (3) and (4) the respective coecient
is insignicant.
A second variable with potentially important eects on private research is re-
search done in the higher education sector (HERD). Regressions (2) and (4) in
Table 3 show that the impact of university research on private research is negative
and signicant. This is indicative of crowding out of business R&D by university re-
search; an eect also found by Guellec and Pottelsberghe (2003). A 10% increase in
university research reduces private R&D employment by 0.4 % in the short run and
by roughly 3% in the long run. This gure remains unchanged in both specications.
Policy implications should, however, be carefully derived. University research is
certainly important to provide rms with highly educated scientists. Additionally,
well-designed cooperation between the public and the private sector is likely to
have a positive impact on business R&D. What matters is not necessarily the pure
quantitative measure of aggregate spending on university research, but also the
quality of the institutions and similar structural variables. In our estimations we
make use of time series variation only. The results measure thus the crowding out
eect of increased spending in universities controlling for the structural variables in
the xed eect.
We can thus conclude that subsidies to R%D remain eective after concluding
additional policy variables. The measured crowding out eect of business research
by university research conrms the evidence of the previous sections, namely that
scientists are in rather inelastic supply.
20(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(L) ln(L) ln(L) ln(L)
LDV 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
(37.67) (34.63) (32.89) (31.73)
ln(1 + β) 0.15 0.24 0.14 0.23
(2.08) (3.13) (1.69) (2.71)
ln(HERD/GDP) -0.04 -0.04
(-2.17) (-2.20)
ln(GOV ERD/GDP) 0.01 0.01
(0.25) (0.32)
ln(openness) 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.12
(3.93) (4.81) (3.55) (4.27)
ln(GDP) 0.18 0.25 0.20 0.26
(2.15) (2.76) (2.11) (2.70)
constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-0.93) (-0.94) (-1.03) (-1.00)
ln(HERD/GDP)long -0.29 -0.29
(p-value) (0.06) (0.06)
AR1 errors, Pr > z 0.59 0.58 0.48 0.18
AR2 errors, Pr > z 0.28 0.11 0.38 0.48
Sargan, Pr > X2 1 1 1 1
Observations 198 192 196 192
Table 3: Estimation period is 1981-2001 in an unbalanced sample. z-statistics (t-
statistics) are in italics. L is the number of researchers. β is the the subsidization
rate, HERD is expenditure on R&D in universities, and GOV ERD is expendi-
ture on R&D in the government sector.The long run elasticity is the coecient of
ln(1 + β) divided by 1 minus the coecient of the lagged dependent variable (LDV).
The p-value of the Wald test on signicance of long run elasticity refers to H0: long-
run eect is zero. Arellano-Bond test on average order 1 autocovariance in residuals
(AR1 errors) with H0: The residuals are not autocorrelated. Arellano-Bond test
on average order 2 autocovariance in residuals (AR2 errors) with H0: The residu-
als are not autocorrelated. Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions (results from
2-step GMM with standard errors not corrected for heteroscedasticity), H0: The
over-identifying restrictions are valid.
215 Conclusions and policy implications
Research and development is an important contributing force for economic devel-
opment and growth. There is empirical evidence that the amount of research un-
dertaken in an economy is lower than the social optimum. One policy tool used to
increase R&D is the provision of subsidies to private rm research, which is done by
all OECD countries.
The present paper has investigated the eectiveness of public subsidies to busi-
ness enterprise research in generating additional research. We thereby explicitly
distinguish between eects of the subsidy on aggregate employment and aggregate
expenditure. The results indicate that subsidies are eective in generating additional
research. In fact, an increase of the subsidization rate by 1 percentage point will lead
to an additional 0.2 percent researchers in the short run. As expenditure on R&D
increases roughly by 60 % more than employment, we interpret this as evidence of
wage increases. In the long run the subsidies' eect is stronger, an increase of the
subsidization rate by 1 percentage point will lead to an additional 1% researchers.
Expenditures increase by 20 to 30 % more than employment leading us to conclude
that even in the long run the impact of subsidies on wages is substantial. Our results
are in line with the ndings of Goolsbee (1998) who nds similar increases in wages
using household survey data. Policy makers should therefore be aware that increas-
ing R&D expenditure per se only partially feeds into a larger number of scientists
and engineers, as wages increase signicantly.
Furthermore, we controlled for research expenditures in universities and gov-
ernment research institutes. While the latter have no eect on business enterprise
research, the empirical results show that university research crowds out business
research employment.
22A Substitution towards capital
Certainly, researchers constitute the most important "input" to research and wages
represent a large part of total spending. Employment in research departments is
the only data on "quantities" used in research available at the macroeconomic level,
since there are no data on capital in research. It is therefore a sensible approach
just to investigate the reaction to a subsidy in terms of the number of employed
researchers.
However, the subsidy could also aect the use of equipment, especially if capital
goods are supplied more elastically than researchers. Government subsidies would
then increase the capital intensity of research. In the following section we analyze
the potential strength of this eect by incorporating capital into the model.
Suppose that R&D is a composite good Y which is produced with capital K and
labor L. The zero prot condition that determines the demand for R&D remains
unchanged, except for the fact that the composite Y instead of labor is the relevant
input. Hence equation 1 takes the form
ϕ(Y,X
d
t )t() = c(w,r)Y (11)
where c(w,r) is the unit cost function in the production of Y and w and r the factor
prices that rms face. In order to concentrate on the substitution eects we assume
a constant elasticity of substitution σ. Therefore, the (standard) CES unit cost










If σ > 1 (σ < 1) capital and labor are gross substitutes (complements) in the sense
that the demand for capital increases (decreases) if the wage rate increases. σ equal
to unity corresponds to the Cobb-Douglas case.12 The parameter γ inuences the
labor income share in research production, which we call α(γ,σ,w,r).
12If σ converges to innity the corresponding production function is linear in L and K, and if
σ = 0 it is Leontie.
23In this paper we nd estimates for the reaction of total research expenditure and
research employment with respect to a increase in the subsidy rate. Total research
expenditure now corresponds to the sum of labor cost and capital cost. We can use
the empirical estimates in order to calculate the increase in wages as a function of
the elasticity of substitution σ and the labor share α.
Proposition 1 Let a1 = ε(Etotal,1 + β) and c1 = ε(L,1 + β) be the elasticities
of total research expenditure and research employment with respect to 1 + β. Total
expenditure is Etotal = (1 + β)c()Y where c() is the unit cost function as given by
equation 12. Assume that capital is in perfectly elastic supply. Then, the elasticity
of the wage rate ws = (1 + β)w with respect to the subsidy rate is
ε(w
s,1 + β) =
a1   c1
α + σ(1   α)
(13)
Proof: In order to proof this proposition, use the labor share in order to express
labor expenditure as fraction of total expenditure, wsL = α()Etotal. Therefore
lnws = lnα()+lnEtotal  lnL. We have to dierentiate this equation with respect
to ln(1 + β). The labor share for the CES production function is given by
α(w,r) =
γσw1−σ
γσw1−σ + (1   γ)σr1−σ.
Given that we assumed capital to supplied elastically, dierentiation of this equation
with respect to ln(1 + β) yields dlnα




= (1   σ)(1   α)
dlnws
dln(1 + β)
+ a1   c1
Rearranging this expressions gives equation 13
q.e.d.
Equation 13 reveals that our estimate a1   c1 gives the true increase in wages if
σ = 1, i.e. the Cobb-Douglas-case, or if labor is the only input in research (α = 1).
We underestimate (overestimate) the true impact on wages if capital and labor are
gross complements (substitutes) in research.
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